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WATCH COMMITTEE
of the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Report of Indications of Soviet-Communist Intentions

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From: 20 September 1951
To : 26 September 1951
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(b)(3) No. 60

SUMMARY OF INDICATIONS DURING PERIOD

1. KOREA: There were no major shifts of ground units or other significant developments during the week suggesting the enemy's intention to resume the offensive in the immediate future. Cumulative evidence shows that the Communists have developed strong defensive positions in depth, particularly in the east and east central sectors, but this activity may be designed to protect forward installations rather than maintain a protracted defensive position. PW reports suggested that further logistical preparations are being undertaken prior to the launching of an offensive, and a resumption of heavy vehicular traffic during the week indicated a continued logistical build-up. An unconfirmed report of the suspension of passenger and commercial rail traffic in Manchuria may indicate a heavy diversion of traffic to military use but may also be partially attributable to flood conditions. The scale of commitment of enemy jet aircraft in northwest Korea is increasing; farther south the Communists are continuing sporadic operations with conventional aircraft over the battle area. A possible Soviet plan to furnish an additional 120 MIG 15's to the CCAF could account for the recent departure of CCAF units of conventional aircraft from Manchuria. The Communist proposal to resume the Kaesong discussions has been very tentative and developments provide little basis for assessing the Communists' intentions in this respect.

2. CHINA: With the identification of two jet fighter regiments in the Shanghai area, the estimated total strength of combat aircraft in Manchuria and China has been increased to 1,300. An unconfirmed report states that Soviet equipment for 27 CCF infantry divisions has now arrived in China.

3. INDOCHINA: The Viet Minh are apparently preparing to attack several weak points in the French defenses in Tonkin and Annam, but a major offensive does not appear to be imminent and recent Viet Minh

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propaganda has been defensive in tone. With the approaching end of the rainy season there have been a number of renewed rumors of [illegible] for a major Chinese Communist intervention, and Soviet advisers are reportedly to be sent to Indochina. Reliable evidence to substantiate rumors of the establishment of a Chinese Communist command post in Indochina or of the staging of CCF forces near the border is lacking however. The Chinese Communist press has admitted a delay in completion of the rail line to the Indochina border with the deadline now set for mid-November 1951.

4. SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITY, GERMANY-AUSTRIA: Evidence, including aerial observations through 24 September, indicates that large-scale Soviet ground maneuvers in Germany were not yet under way, although some preparations for them have been noted. The jet fighter strength of the 24th Air Army in Germany has increased to 597 and its ground attack units are now practically at 100 percent of T/E. Six of the seven long runways under construction in Germany are expected to be operational by winter. The Soviet 59th Air Army in Austria-Hungary may now have 239 MIG-15's, reflecting its rapid rate of reequipment. Further evidence of the arrival of Soviet women in Germany to replace German employees at Soviet military installations represents further tightening of Soviet security measures in Germany.

5. EAST GERMANY: The East German propaganda campaign to secure West German agreement to proposals for German "unification" continues to receive major emphasis, but the Communists' objective is apparently to delay the integration of West Germany into Western defense plans rather than to make concessions towards free all-German elections. East German oral agreement to reduce economic pressure on Berlin has somewhat eased the economic situation, at least for the time being.

6. SATELLITES: Major airfield improvements are reportedly under way at a total of 17 locations in the Satellites. There is evidence of continuing emphasis on civil and air defense preparations in Hungary and Bulgaria. Combined maneuvers on a divisional level are possibly now under way in western Czechoslovakia. Limited recalls of Army reservists or previously deferred men may be under way in Hungary and could indicate plans for an Army expansion. Recent information indicates either a build-up of major Army supply installations in the Yambol area of Bulgaria during early 1951 or the equipping on Soviet T/E of a Bulgarian rifle division. According to several recent reports whose validity has not been established, planes with Yugoslav markings have been noted at airfields in Hungary and are to be utilized by the Hungarians to provoke an incident involving Yugoslavia. The reports may arise from the presence of a single Yugoslav plane in Hungary whose crew defected in April. There have been previous rumors of preparations for fifth column action against Yugoslavia.

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U.S.S.R.: Reliable observations of the induction of youthful military conscripts in the U.S.S.R. may reflect the call-up of the remainder of the 1931 class and an advance contingent of the 1932 class. The Soviet announcement of the merger of the three civilian defense or para-military organizations (Dosarm, Dosav, and Dosflot) probably represents an effort to increase efficiency, and a concurrent announcement stressing the necessity of forming more civilian defense groups may indicate an acceleration of civilian defense preparations.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The Soviet Armed Forces in being are in an advanced state of readiness for war and could initiate offensive operations with little or no additional warning. Anticipated large-scale Soviet maneuvers in Germany will increase Soviet capabilities for a surprise attack against the West. Divisional and larger unit exercises have annually followed small unit training which is now underway in Germany. There are, however, no firm indications that the U.S.S.R. intends to initiate hostilities with its own forces in the immediate future.

2. There are no definite indications of Communist intentions to undertake a major offensive in Korea in the immediate future, although the enemy forces maintain the capability to do so at any time. The enemy's commitment of increasing numbers of jet aircraft further reflects his capability and intention of challenging U.N. air superiority over North Korea. The tentative proposal of the Communists to resume cease-fire discussions provides no firm basis for assessing their political intentions.

3. There continue to be no firm indications of Chinese Communist preparations for major military operations other than in Korea. Renewed rumors of a major CCF intervention in Indochina have not been substantiated.

4. The continuing increase in Soviet and Satellite military capabilities in Europe is evidenced by the further build-up of Soviet jet fighter and ground attack aircraft strength, progress in airfield improvements, and Satellite military programs. There is evidence of continuing stress on civilian defense preparations in both the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe, and Soviet security measures in Germany have been tightened.

5. Current developments suggest that continued Communist pressure on West Germany will be primarily political and psychological and that it is designed to delay the integration of Germany into Western defense plans.

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Indications of Intentions in the Far East.

a. KOREA.

(1) Ground. Enemy activity during the week was marked by an absence of major shifts of units or other significant new developments. There were no firm indications of the enemy's intention to resume the offensive in the immediate future, despite his continued capability to do so at any time. There was, however, a resumption of heavy vehicular traffic, indicating a continued logistical build up. Following a decline in vehicular sightings during the previous week to a daily average of 843, average sightings for the period 17-24 September increased to 2,136 and the daily southbound average was 1,549. Cumulative evidence suggests that the enemy has increased his capabilities for a protracted defense, particularly in the eastern sector of the front where well-organized defensive positions in depth including bunkers, pill boxes, and dug-in emplacements have been noted. Although sightings on the west and west-central sectors have not indicated such well-prepared defensive positions as in the east, there is evidence of bunkers, trench networks, and anti-tank traps in various portions of the western front. AAA fire has also increased, both in volume and effectiveness, along the entire front. Whether these defensive preparations, which have been developed over a period of time, reflect an enemy intention to maintain a protracted defensive position cannot be determined. It appears equally possible that these preparations are designed to protect forward installations from U.N. penetration and to insure a continuing build-up for an ultimate offense. Meanwhile, reports from PW's have indicated that enemy front-line units may be suffering from a food shortage and that an offensive may be delayed pending further logistical preparations. One PW has reported hearsay information that a new road is being built southeast of Wonsan through heavy forest in order to permit the movement of tanks and war materiel for a coming all-out offensive.

There were no identifications of additional Chinese Communist units in Korea during the week and no major redispositions were noted. Total enemy strength in Korea is now estimated at 680,000, including 263,000 North Koreans and 417,000 Chinese Communists. There were some further indications of Chinese Communist preparations for continued operations in Korea, including a report that the 87th division of the CCF 29th Army may be moved to Korea from Fukien Province. Also, according to a report of undetermined reliability, all passenger and commercial traffic has been suspended on most Manchurian

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rail lines as of 15 September in order to handle military traffic. The rail lines involved allegedly include not only connecting links to the Korean border and the Peiping-Mukden line, but also the lines from the Soviet Union into Manchuria. A previous report stated that the Communists had requisitioned for military use all freight cars in the Peiping-Shanghai area. These reports, if true, might indicate a major diversion of rail traffic for military use such as preceded the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea last autumn, although recent severe flood conditions in Manchuria may also be a contributing factor in suspension of normal rail service.

A preliminary analysis of rocket fragments recovered in Korea has revealed Soviet markings, and it now appears probable that the Soviet 132-mm rocket has been utilized as either a ground or air-to-ground weapon.

(2) Air. Although there appear to be no new indications of enemy intentions in the air war in Korea, the scale of enemy commitment of jet aircraft is increasing. On both 25 and 26 September well over 100 separate aircraft were committed, representing the largest number of enemy jets yet encountered. The number of MIG-15 sorties observed on 25 September was 146, and on 26 September this rose to 190. The enemy's determination to maintain at least sporadic air operations in the battle area is indicated by continuing attempted harassing and interception activity by enemy conventional aircraft in central Korea. Flights of one or two aircraft have been observed both by day and night. Reports of recent night flying training by jets from Anshan, including MIG-15's, may also indicate enemy preparations for operations against U.N. night intruders over North Korea. Although most of the important enemy airfields in North Korea continue to be unserviceable, several enemy airfields are in serviceable condition.

According to information considered possibly true, the Soviet Far East Air Force recently requested Moscow to supply the CCAF immediately with an additional 120 MIG-15's. The introduction of these aircraft into Manchuria, or their anticipated arrival, may be the reason that several units of conventional aircraft were moved out of Manchuria into the Peiping area during the first part of September (see Watch Committee Report No. 59).

(3) Political. Communist propaganda and developments in connection with the Kaesong discussions during the week provided little basis on which to estimate the Communists' intentions. It still cannot be determined whether the Communists are attempting to continue the present stalemate indefinitely or actually

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desire to resume the talks. Although the Chinese Communists appear desirous of maintaining continued connections with U.N. negotiators, their agreement to resume discussions has been a very tentative one. The Communist proposal for a resumption of full sessions at Kaesong was hedged with the condition that machinery be established to inquire into previous incidents, and Communist liaison officers insisted that they were authorized only to discuss the time and place of plenary meetings and not such matters as a change in the site of the negotiations. The Communist walk-out on 25 September was described by the Peiping radio, however, as a "disbanding" rather than breakoff of the meetings. There was no comment from Moscow on a possible resumption of discussions.

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states that the Chinese Communists are "most anxious" for a cease fire in Korea and that, if the Kaesong conferences are resumed, their negotiators will be authorized to accept the present U.N. battle line as the northern boundary of the buffer zone. Although representing some slight concession from the previous Communist position, such a proposal to neutralize the area between the 38th parallel and the present battle line would come very close to the original Communist demand.

b. CHINA. Reports indicate that the supply of Soviet equipment to both the Chinese Communist ground and air forces is continuing. There are now estimated to be two jet fighter regiments in the Shanghai area, and the total number of combat aircraft in Manchuria and China is now estimated at about 1,300. This includes some 110 aircraft of the North Korean Air Force based in Manchuria and a total of 670 jet fighters of undetermined subordination.

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equipment for two CCF infantry divisions arrived in Mukden during July and August and that Soviet equipment delivered to date has been sufficient to equip 27 infantry divisions. The supply of Soviet equipment in these amounts has not been verified, and there is no evidence yet of improved equipment in the hands of newly committed CCF units.

c. INDOCHINA. Concurrent with the approaching end of the rainy season and indications of Viet Minh preparations to initiate small-scale attacks, there have been renewed rumors of plans for a major Chinese Communist intervention together with reports that Soviet advisers will be sent from China to Indochina. The latter reports are generally from sources of questionable reliability, and there continues to be no firm evidence that a Chinese Communist intervention is imminent or that the U.S.S.R. is taking a more direct interest in Viet Minh activities. According to one report, some 16 Soviet military advisers now in Canton are to be sent to Indochina in the near future, and a Taipei radio broadcast further alleged that 100 Soviet military advisers in Nanning have been alerted to proceed to Indochina. Although reports of Soviet advisers with the Viet Minh have

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[illegible] infrequent in the past, such a development is plausible but [illegible] confirmed until the French are able to establish the presence of such personnel in Tonkin itself. Reports of alleged Chinese Communist plans to intervene have included the rumored establishment of headquarters for the Chinese Communist "volunteers" at Thai Nguyen, alleged plans to move a force of former Hainan "irregulars" into Tonkin via Moncay, and claims from two sources that a CCF attack in Indochina will be launched concurrently with a renewed offensive in Korea. Another report that 60,000 troops from the CCF 15th and 16th Armies are being staged in the Nanning-Lungchow area under the command of Chen Keng has not been confirmed, and in the absence of reliable information all these reports must be viewed with reserve. There is meanwhile confirmation from the statements of the Chinese Communists themselves that the completion of the railway from Laipin to Chemmankuan on the Indochina border has been delayed. The Communist press has admitted that a serious explosion in Nanning destroyed large amounts of engineering supplies for the railway, and the Peiping radio has subsequently announced that the deadline for completion of the line is now mid-November 1951.

Current Viet Minh movements and dispositions indicate that the Viet Minh forces are making preparations to attack the French at the weakest points of French defenses: in northwest Tonkin, at Son La and Nghia Lo in the west, and at Moncay in the northeast coastal zone. Two Viet Minh regiments in northern Annam are also reportedly preparing to attack French positions and convoy routes. It appears unlikely, however, that a Viet Minh offensive in full strength is to be launched in the near future, and recent Viet Minh propaganda has been unusually defensive in tone in contrast to the belligerent attitude at this time last year. A recent Viet Minh broadcast stating that the enemy would take advantage of good weather to attack and that the Viet Minh must be ready apparently reflects particular concern with French air activity, and great stress was also laid on the stockpiling of rice supplies.

2. Indications of Intentions in Europe.

a. SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITY, GERMANY-AUSTRIA.

(1) Soviet Ground Forces. Available evidence suggests that large-scale maneuvers by Soviet ground forces in East Germany have not yet begun. No significant change has occurred in the disposition of Soviet line divisions, and the pattern of field training appears to remain at regimental level. The apparent reassembly of Army engineer, artillery and antiaircraft units back in their respective Army areas may foreshadow the approaching start of large-scale maneuvers, which are expected to begin in the near future in conformance with last year's training pattern. However, aerial reconnaissance of the Letzlinger Heide and Eisenach-Ohrdruf training areas through 24 September disclosed no preparatory large-scale troop movements.

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(2) Soviet Air Force Strength and Operational Capability. There are indications that Soviet air strength in Germany and Austria-Hungary continues to increase and that the current program for expanding air facilities in Germany is nearing completion. The jet strength of the 24th Air Army in Germany has increased by 16 MIG-15's during the past month, bringing the total jet fighter count in its area to 597, and the increased strength of the Army's ground attack units has now brought them practically to 100 percent of their table of equipment. A rapid rate of reequipping of the Soviet 59th Air Army in Austria-Hungary is indicated by evidence that it may now possess as many as 239 MIG-15's. Of these, 97 are located in Austria and the balance in Hungary at Papa, Debrecen and Budapest-Tokol airfields. The program of airfield improvement in the Soviet Zone of Germany, which includes seven locations at which long runways are being developed, is reportedly nearing completion. With the exception of one airfield, they will all be in operation before winter.

(3) Replacement of German Employees. Further reports indicate that Soviet women are continuing to arrive in Germany aboard leave trains and in special shipments and that the movement has been under way since 24 July (see Watch Committee Report No. 59). The total numbers have not been fully established but have been estimated at at least 5,000. While the evidence is not yet clear as to what work these women are to do, it appears that they are to replace certain German employees in Soviet offices, barracks and messes in East Germany. Replacement of kitchen employees has already occurred at one installation and the discharge of German employees at ten other installations ostensibly for replacement by Soviet personnel has been reported. This program, the full scale of which is not yet determined, represents further tightening of the already stringent Soviet security measures prevalent in Germany.

b. EAST GERMANY. Developments since Premier Grotewohl's speech of 15 September proposing all-German elections and an early peace treaty (Watch Committee Report No. 59) continue to indicate that a major propaganda effort is to be devoted to the proposal. General Chuikov, head of the Soviet Control Commission, endorsed the East German effort in an interview on 20 September, and the Soviet press has continued to give the proposal extensive coverage. Grotewohl has expanded his initial proposal in subsequent statements, and the East German Lower House has now telegraphed an appeal to its West German counterpart for discussions. An unwillingness by Grotewohl to cope with the issue of free elections in a definitive fashion, however, indicates that the proposals are primarily for psychological effect rather than a serious effort to reconcile East and West Germany on any but Soviet terms. Continued development of the theme

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that "alliance with the West means war, unity with the East means peace," establishes the primary intent of the proposals as a means for causing uncertainty in West Germany and delaying its integration into Western defense efforts.

Concurrent with these political developments, economic pressure on Berlin has been relaxed by conclusion of an oral agreement (a West German precondition for signing the Interzonal Trade Pact) regarding the conditions under which West Berlin-West German traffic is to be resumed. Under the oral commitment, the East Germans agreed to modify their requirements on manifests, reduce road taxes, open the Rothensee Lock on the Mitteland Canal, and cease confiscating German vehicles. All commitments have not as yet been met in full but recent evidence indicates that a lessening of harassment has occurred. It remains problematicl whether recent East German economic pressure was intended only to secure agreement on the Trade Pact.

c. SATELLITES.

(1) Satellite Airfield Improvements. Latest information indicates that the program of airfield improvements under way in the Satellites includes construction at eight locations in Poland, one in Czechoslovakia, two in Hungary, three in Rumania, and three in Bulgaria. In most cases the plans appear to call for runways exceeding 8,000 feet in length.

(2) Air and Civil Defense Preparations. Reports from Hungary and Bulgaria indicate that air and civil defense measures continue to receive attention in the Satellites. In Bulgaria, passive air defense instructions are reportedly being given weekly to men and women in the Yambol area by a Bulgarian rifle regiment. Although such defense preparations have been reported in Bulgaria since mid-1950, this is the first indication that the Army is actively engaged in instructing the civilian populace in passive defense. In Hungary, (b)(1) (b)(3) a civilian defense course of three months' duration has been established in Magyarovar (northwest Hungary) and one hundred women have allegedly been selected for compulsory attendance. In addition the police have directed that all wartime air raid shelters in the city be cleaned out. Similarly, in Budapest there are reports of repair and extension of air raid shelters, and recent evidence suggests that a concentrated effort is also being made to improve the antiaircraft defenses of the city. Twenty-four 85-mm antiaircraft guns were reliably observed in September at a new installation in the Budapest area, where no AA equipment had been reported previously, and 37-mm and 85-mm AA guns are at three other installations.

(3) Czechoslovakia. Recent observations suggest that large scale maneuvers, possibly at division level, may be under way in Czechoslovakia in the Cisarsky Les area near the

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Western border. Military traffic in northwest Czechoslovakia reportedly has the appearance normally associated with a build-up for combined maneuvers at divisional level, casernes in the area appear to be only partially filled, some mechanized equipment sheds are empty, and signal troops have been observed laying wire on the roads. Troop and staff training during the last year possibly has progressed sufficiently to make maneuvers on division scale feasible.

(4) Hungary. The previously noted recall of reserve specialists in Poland and Bulgaria may be paralleled by developments in Hungary where a regular program for reserve training was initiated last February. Small groups of inductees of various ages but none apparently under 25 have recently been observed in Budapest. The apparent sporadic nature of short-term or reservist inductions in Hungary throughout the year has precluded the establishment of a definite induction pattern. If the observed groups are previously deferred older men rather than reservists, however, an expansion of the Hungarian Army from its currently estimated 100,000 may be contemplated.

(5) Bulgaria. [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) provides the first firm indication that major supply installations have been established in the Yambol area (50 miles west of Burgas) or that the Bulgarian rifle division in this area has been brought up to T/E strength. [redacted] in early 1951 heavy guns, antitank guns, armored vehicles, tanks and other materiel arrived in Yambol and that seven large materiel depots are located east of the city. This materiel may have been intended in part for the 3d Bulgarian Rifle Division, with headquarters at Yambol, since at that time it was below T/E strength. [redacted] border security measures have been tightened recently, with identification cards and luggage being checked at various points near the Greek border, is supported by the sharp drop in the arrival of Bulgarian defectors in Greece beginning in July and continuing through August. (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3)

(6) Possible Preparations Against Yugoslavia. Several recent reports have stated that planes with Yugoslav markings have been noted at airfields in Hungary and that they are to be utilized to provoke a Satellite incident with Yugoslavia. In addition to Marshal Tito's public statement that bombing planes with Yugoslav markings are poised in Hungary ready to bomb Yugoslavia, [redacted] in late August planes were being prepared with Yugoslav markings at the Matyasfold airfield near Budapest. Subsequent evidence (b)(1) (b)(3)

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confirmed the presence of one such plane at Matyasfold, although the significance of this was largely discounted by the possibility that it may be a Yugoslav plane the crew of which defected last April. Two sources in Yugoslavia also have reported that Hungarian planes are being repainted with Yugoslav markings. A further report from sources of uncertain reliability in Trieste recently alleged that the Soviets would bomb a Hungarian city during September in a plane with Yugoslav markings in order to provoke Yugoslav-Hungarian hostilities. It cannot be established whether these rumors, which may all arise from a single report, have any validity, and Tito's speech appears to have been primarily propaganda. There have been some previous reports of uncertain reliability suggesting similar preparations for fifth column action against Yugoslavia, including a rumor that Yugoslav uniforms are being manufactured in Czechoslovakia.

3. General Indications of Soviet Intentions.

a. SOVIET ARMY INDUCTIONS. According to observations in Moscow and Saratov, youthful military conscripts have been noted for the first time since late spring. It is believed that these conscripts may represent the call-up of the remainder of the 1931 class as well as an advance contingent of the 1932 class who were registered early this year. This would be normal Soviet practice.

b. SOVIET CIVILIAN DEFENSE REORGANIZATION. On 19 September the merger of the three civilian defense or para-military organizations of the Army (Dosarm), the Navy (Dosflot) and the Air Force (Dosav) was announced in Moscow. The new group, with a combined strength of 16,000,000 people, will be known as the "Volunteer Society for the Aid of the Army, Air Force and Navy," and will be headed by Col. Gen. Vasili Kuznetsov, formerly head of Dosarm. The former tripartite organizations were frequently criticized in the Soviet press for inefficiency, and the reorganization probably represents an effort to increase efficiency by centralizing policy formation, direction and responsibility. That the development may represent an acceleration of the civilian defense program as well as an administrative streamlining is suggested by a concurrent announcement stressing the necessity of forming civilian defense groups throughout the country down to the village level. The announced intention to establish civilian defense units in villages and collective farms parallels a similar effort to broaden the sports program in rural areas, and qualifying for the GTO (Ready for Defense and Labor) award is a part of the sports program.

c. SOVIET DOCTRINE ON WAR. Recent Soviet articles attacking those Marxists who adhere to the doctrinaire position of the "inevitability of war" do not appear to represent a basic shift in Soviet dogma. They appear rather to be part of a continuing Soviet campaign to reconcile the inevitability of war doctrine with the Soviet "peace campaign" and to

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represent an effort to overcome possible popular apathy growing out of a feeling that nothing need or can be done to affect the international situation. It represents an extension of the thesis outlined by Stalin in his Pravda interview in February 1951 in which he declared that war "may become inevitable" if the warmongers succeed in deceiving the people but that "peace will be preserved" if the people take matters into their own hands.

JOHN WECKERLING
Brigadier General, GSC
Chairman, Watch Committee

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